Knowledgebase

Supreme Court Digest, 2009-2010

A.P. Civil Services (CC & A) Rules, 1991

Rule 20(3)–Constitution of India, 1950, Article 311–Service and Labour Law–Dismissal from service|–Right of appeal–Departmental enquiry against the respondent and others for the irregularities of large scale misappropriation of bitumen belonging to Government valued at about more than Rs. Forty Lakhs–The respondent was placed under suspension–Respondent who was incharge of stores not been able to properly account for missing quantities of bitumen–Government having examined the Enquiry Officer’s report and material available on record provisionally decided to impose a major penalty of dismissal from service on the respondent–High Court allowed the Writ Petition only on the ground that the impugned order of dismissal has been passed by the State Government imposing the major punishment of dismissal from service depriving the employee of his right of appeal–Right of appeal no doubt is a substantive one but not inherent or fundamental right–No appeal lies to the higher authority as a matter of right unless provided for by the law–There is a right of review provided under the Rules to an aggrieved employee which was not availed of by the respondent–Rules clearly empower not only the disciplinary authority but as well as the Government to impose appropriate punishment as against delinquent public servant for proven charges of misconduct–Judgment of the High Court is accordingly set aside.; Government of A.P. & Anr. v. N. Ramanaiah : 2009(3) Law Herald (SC) 1914 : 2009 (7) SCC 165 : 2009 (6) JT 606

Administrative Tribunals Act, 1985

S.19–Constitution of India, 1950, Art. 226, 227 & 228–Transfer of application–Power of the High Court under Article 227 of the Constitution of India to transfer an application filed under Section 19 of the Administrative Tribunal Act pending before the Administrative Tribunal to the High Court–Tribunal could not hear the application for various reasons–Respondent who was applicant before the Tribunal filed one more writ petition under Article 226 and 227 of the Constitution–He requested the court for issuance of a writ in the nature of mandamus directing the respondents to give appointment to him with effect from 6.3.2000 and to release arrears of salary and other benefits–High Court in exercise of its supervisory jurisdiction was justified in directing the Tribunal to transmit all the records pertaining to the case of the respondent, since there was inordinate delay by the Tribunal in deciding an application which did not involve either complicated questions of fact or the law–Correctness of the order passed by the Division Bench of the High Court, wherein the High Court has withdrawn the application pending before the Administrative Tribunal for its consideration and decision–It would have been proper if the High Court in exercising its jurisdiction under Article 227 had directed the Tribunal to dispose of the matter expeditiously, instead of transferring the matter to itself–Impugned order is set aside–Tribunal directed to consider the matter promptly.; State of West Bengal & Ors. v. Samar Kumar Sarkar : 2009(5) Law Herald (SC) 2919 : 2009(11) JT 258

S.19–Constitution of India, 1950, Art. 228–Transfer of application–Conditions that require to be fulfilled before Article 228 of the Constitution can be applied are, that a case must be pending in the Court subordinate to the High Court, the case must involve a substantial question of law as to the interpretation of the Constitution or the Government of India Act, 1935 and the determination of the question of law must be necessary for disposal of the case. Once these three conditions are fulfilled, the Article requires that the High Court will withdraw the case and then may either dispose of the case itself or determine the question of law and return the case to the Court from which the case has been withdrawn.; State of West Bengal & Ors. v. Samar Kumar Sarkar : 2009(5) Law Herald (SC) 2919 : 2009(11) JT 258

Adverse Possession

Adverse Possession–Adverse possession in one sense is based on the theory or presumption that the owner has abandoned the property to the adverse possessor on the acquiescence of the owner to the hostile acts and claims of the person in possession. It follows that sound qualities of a typical adverse possession lie in it being open, continuous and hostile.; Mandal Revenue Officer v. Goundla Venkaiah : 2010(1) Law Herald (SC) 630

Adverse Possession–Claim by adverse possession has two elements: (1) the possession of the defendant should become adverse to the plaintiff; and (2) the defendant must continue to remain in possession for a period of 12 years thereafter. Animus possidendi as is well known is a requisite ingredient of adverse possession. It is now a well-settled principle of law that mere possession of the land would not ripen into possessory title for the said purpose. Possessor must have animus possidendi and hold the land adverse to the title of the true owner. For the said purpose, not only animus possidendi must be shown to exist, but the same must be shown to exist at the commencement of the possession. He must continue in the said capacity for the period prescribed under the Limitation Act. Mere long possession, it is trite, for a period of more than 12 years without anything more does not ripen into a title.”; Mandal Revenue Officer v. Goundla Venkaiah : 2010(1) Law Herald (SC) 630

Adverse possession–Encroachers, unauthorised occupants or land grabbers–Where an encroacher, illegal occupant or land grabber of public property raises a plea that he has perfected title by adverse possession, the Court is duty bound to act with greater seriousness, care and circumspection–Any laxity in this regard may result in destruction of right/title of the State to immovable property and give upper hand to the encroachers, unauthorised occupants or land grabbers.; Mandal Revenue Officer v. Goundla Venkaiah : 2010(1) Law Herald (SC) 630

Adverse Possession–To assess a claim of adverse possession, two-pronged enquiry is required:

1. Application of limitation provision thereby jurisprudentially “wilful neglect” element on part of the owner established. Successful application in this regard distances the title of the land from the paper-owner.

2. Specific positive intention to dispossess on the part of the adverse possessor effectively shifts the title already distanced from the paper-owner, to the adverse possessor. Right thereby accrues in favour of adverse possessor as intent to dispossess is an express statement of urgency and intention in the upkeep of the property.; Mandal Revenue Officer v. Goundla Venkaiah : 2010(1) Law Herald (SC) 630

Advocates Act

Section 34–Advocates–Role of lawye|–BMW Trial–Falling professional norms among the lawyers–Decline of ethical and professional standards among lawyers–The conduct of the two appellants (one convicted of committing criminal contempt of court and the other found guilty of misconduct as Special Prosecutor), both of them lawyers of long standing, and designated Senior Advocates, should not be seen in isolation. The bitter truth is that the facts of the case are manifestation of the general erosion of the professional values among lawyers at all levels–Even some highly successful lawyers seem to live by their own rules of conduct.; R.K. Anand v. Registrar, Delhi High Court : 2009(4) Law Herald (SC) 2785 : 2009 (8) SCC 106 : 2009 (10) JT 1

Air Force Act, 1950

Section 19–Air Force Rules, 1969, Rule 15.–Constitution of India, 1950, Article 136–Service & Labour Law–Compulsory Retirement|–Failure to submit the property returns within time–Transactions were between 1981 to 1986 and the return was belatedly filed after about six years on 23.3.1992 therefore the conduct was most unbecoming of an officer of the Air Force–Prescribed period for filing property return is six months and though appellant was aware of the requirement he did not choose to file any return, even during the course of enquiry no return was filed and ultimately after show cause notice was issued it was filed–Not only there was belated filing of the returns but also there were several other instances of misconduct–Order of compulsory retirement upheld; Praveen Bhatia v. Union of India : 2009(2) Law Herald (SC) 858 : AIR 2009 (SC) 2626 : 2009 (4) SCC 225 : 2009 (3) JT 549

Sections 132 & 189–Air Force Rules, 1969, Rule 43.–Constitution of India, 1950, Articles 14 & 226–Service & Labour Law–General Court Martial|–Witnesses named in respect of first three charges were not examined–No reason assigned as to why the named witnesses who only could prove the charge had not been examined indisputably, they were the prime witnesses–High Court in its impugned judgment proceeded to consider the issue on a technical plea, namely, no prejudice has been caused to the appellant by such non-examination–If the basic principles of law have not been complied with or there has been gross violation of the principles of natural justice, the High Court should have exercised its jurisdiction of judicial review–Before a Court martial proceeding is convened, legal requirements there for must be satisfied–Satisfaction of the Officer concerned must be premised on a finding that evidence justified a trial on those charges–Such a satisfaction cannot be arrived at without any evidence–If an order is passed without any evidence, the same must be held to be perverse; Rajiv Arora v. Union of India, D/d. 29/08/2008 : 2009(2) Law Herald (SC) 741

Air Force Pension Regulations

Regulation 37–Disability Pension–Respondent was initially appointed as an Air Force Personnel in the Indian Air Force– There was a medical examination held in which he was found to be fit to be appointed to the Air Force. –After he had rendered service in the Air Force for about 15 years, the respondent was examined by the Release Medical Board and he was diagnosed as a case of retinal detachment and immature cataract of both the eyes–A Medical Board assessed composite disability at 90%–Respondent was released from service–Disability for which the respondent was released from service were constitutional in nature–Authorities namely Chief Controller of Defence Accounts (Pension) and the appellate medical authority examined the case of the respondent and thereafter both the authorities held that the disability suffered by the respondent was not due to injury suffered during the course of duty or because of nature of duties performed by the respondent–Appellate authority also gave an opinion that the disease of the respondent was neither attributable to nor aggravated by Air Force service– Medical Board gave a categorical opinion that the diseases for which the respondent has been released from service were neither attributable to nor aggravated by Air Force service– Pension Regulations when read with the Entitlement Rules, make it clear that the determination of attributable or aggravation is as per the Entitlement Rules– As the Medial Board gave a categorical opinion that the ailment of the respondent was constitutional and the same is not attributable to or aggravated by Air Force Service, it was unjustified for the Single Judge to set aside the aforesaid concurrent opinions of the appellate Board and Released Medical Board and also the findings recorded by the trial court–Judgment and order of the Single Judge set aside.; Union of India v. Ram Prakash : 2010(4) Law Herald (SC) 2794

Air Force Rules, 1969

Rule 15.–Constitution of India, 1950, Article 136–Air Force Act, 1950, Section 19–Service & Labour Law–Compulsory Retirement|–Failure to submit the property returns within time–Transactions were between 1981 to 1986 and the return was belatedly filed after about six years on 23.3.1992 therefore the conduct was most unbecoming of an officer of the Air Force–Prescribed period for filing property return is six months and though appellant was aware of the requirement he did not choose to file any return, even during the course of enquiry no return was filed and ultimately after show cause notice was issued it was filed–Not only there was belated filing of the returns but also there were several other instances of misconduct–Order of compulsory retirement upheld; Praveen Bhatia v. Union of India : 2009(2) Law Herald (SC) 858 : AIR 2009 (SC) 2626 : 2009 (4) SCC 225 : 2009 (3) JT 549

Rule 43–Constitution of India, 1950, Articles 14 & 226–Air Force Act, 1950, Sections 132 & 189–Service & Labour Law–General Court Martial|–Witnesses named in respect of first three charges were not examined–No reason assigned as to why the named witnesses who only could prove the charge had not been examined indisputably, they were the prime witnesses–High Court in its impugned judgment proceeded to consider the issue on a technical plea, namely, no prejudice has been caused to the appellant by such non-examination–If the basic principles of law have not been complied with or there has been gross violation of the principles of natural justice, the High Court should have exercised its jurisdiction of judicial review–Before a Court martial proceeding is convened, legal requirements there for must be satisfied–Satisfaction of the Officer concerned must be premised on a finding that evidence justified a trial on those charges–Such a satisfaction cannot be arrived at without any evidence–If an order is passed without any evidence, the same must be held to be perverse; Rajiv Arora v. Union of India, D/d. 29/08/2008 : 2009(2) Law Herald (SC) 741

Airlines Flying Crew Service Regulations

Regn. 12–Termination of Services–Overweight–Condition of appointment-Appellants working as Air Hostesses with Indian Airlines–During their service the weight requirements were prescribed by the Indian Airlines at various times–Circular dt. 4-11-1987 was issued by Airlines provided that if a crew member’s weight exceeded 10% of the limit prescribed, he or she should be taken off flying duties and treated on leave or leave without pay till he/she attains standard weight-Vide Circular dt. 4-05-2006, Airlines withdrew 3 kgs. grace in weight limit w.e.f. 15-6-2006-Said circular was challenged by Air Hostesses-Single Judge held that Air Hostesses were supposed to keep their body weight within minimum and maximum prescribed limits-This was known to the Air Hostesses all along as it was a condition of their appointment-Single Judge held that Air Hostesses had accepted all earlier circulars, therefore they had no justification to challenge circular dt 4-5-2006-On appeal, Division Bench confirmed order of Single Judge–During the pendency of the proceedings in this Court 11 out of 13 appellants have reduced weight to satisfy the acceptable norms and are already back on duty-Held, it is inappropriate to express any opinion on merits of controversy in appeal as petitioners from the original writ petitioners have rejoined duties-If any writ petitioners have any independent grievances with regard to non-payment or illegal withholding of any of amounts due, employees would be at liberty to either approach the Airlines.; Sheela Joshi v. Indian Airlines Ltd. : 2009(6) Law Herald (SC) 4265 : AIR 2010 (SC) 302 : 2010 (1)SCC 376 : 2009 (14) JT 623

Air (Prevention and Control of Pollution) Act, 1981

Water (Prevention and Control of Pollution) Act, 1974–Environment (Protection) Act, 1986–Hazardous Chemicals (Manufacture, Storage and Import) Rules, 1989–Constitution of India, Art. 32–Coastal Zone Management Plan of Tamil Nadu, 1996–Environment–Pollution and Health hazards–Transfer of hazardous substances– Respondent proposed to set up a project for manufacturing Poly-Vinyl Chloride (PVC)–Environmental Impact Assessment Report (EIA) as well as Risk Analysis Report (RA) for the proposed PVC project obtained–One of the raw-materials for manufacturing PVC was Vinyl Chloride Monomer (VCM) was to be imported–Respondent in their proposal also proposed to install a Marine Terminal Facility (MTF) near the seashore for receiving and transferring VCM from the ships to the PVC plant through underground pipeline–Ministry of Environment and Forests, Government of India (MOEF) after examining proposal submitted by the Respondent granted environmental clearance–Executive Engineer, cancelled permission observing that VCM may cause pollution and health hazard to the public–Order cancelling permission challenged–High Court allowed writ petition–PIL filed before the High Court and also directly before this Court–Whether paragraph 2(ii) of 1991 Notification restricts transfer of VCM (hazardous substance) beyond port area to the PVC plant through pipelines–Uppanar river and its banks where the pipelines pass have tidal influence and come under the CRZ area–1991 Notification has been amended from time to time–In the original 1991 Notification there was no exception clause–Uppanar river and its banks at the relevant place where the pipelines laid by the Chemplast pass do not fall under CRZ III area as per 1996 Plan and no environmental clearance is needed for such pipelines–MOEF in their affidavit before this Court have clearly stated that the permission granted to Chemplast on 19th December, 2005 is in exercise of the powers conferred under paragraph 3(2)(ii) of 1991 Notification–No infirmity in the permission granted by the MOEF on 19th December, 2005–No illegality in the permission granted by the Executive Engineer on February 27, 2008 either–Project established by investing huge amount of about Rs. 600 crores and already been commissioned after obtaining necessary approvals and, therefore, it shall not be in the interest of justice nor in the public interest now to interfere with the project.; M. Nizamudeen v. M/s. Chemplast Sanmar Limited : 2010(2) Law Herald (SC) 1127

Airports Authority of India Act, 1994

Civil Procedure Code, 1908, Order 1, R.10–Impleadment of proper/necessary party–Pursuant to the competitive bidding process, the Chhtrapati Shivaji International Airport, Mumbai was handed over to the appellant for operation, maintenance, development and expansion into a world class airport– Parcel measuring 31,000 sq.m. was also part of the airport that was to be handed over by AAI to appellant but it could not be included in view of a pending case filed by the first respondent–Appellant alleges that it was expecting that the litigation initiated by the first respondent would end and it would be able to get the said 31,000 sq.m. land also as it was in dire need of land for developing the airport–It therefore filed an application seeking impleadment as an additional defendant in the pending suit filed by the first respondent against AAI, contending that its interest was likely to be directly affected if any relief is granted to the first respondent-plaintiff in the suit–Single Judge as also DB dismissed the suit– Whether the appellant is a necessary or proper party to the suit for specific performance filed by the first respondent–Held, NO; Mumbai International Airport Pvt. Ltd. v. Regency Convention Centre & Hotels Pvt. Ltd. : 2010(4) Law Herald (SC) 2798

Allahabad High Court Rules, 1952

Contempt of Courts Act, 1971, Section 23–Indian Penal Code, 1860, S. 364–Criminal Contempt–Illegal detention–Habeas Corpus–Illegal detention of detenue–FIR lodged–Habeas Corpus petition filed before the High Court–Whereabouts of detenue could not be known–High Court disposed of the Habeas Corpus by transferring the investigation to CBI–For contempt case High Court concluded that taking the said detenue into custody, was in violation of the directions issued by this Court and held all the three alleged contemnors guilty, direction issued to the State to terminate their services after holding disciplinary proceedings–Appeal–Whether the contempt proceedings had been concluded in conformity with the Rules, 1952–No case filed by the State of U.P. before the High Court in respect of abduction nor any application for initiating contempt proceedings was ever filed by any person–Proceedings were initiated by the High Court suo motu–Notice did not mention as what was the allegation/accusation against either of the contemnor–Neither the report of the District Judge nor any evidence collected by him during that inquiry, nor any other document relevant to the case was annexed with the said notice–In absence of the charge(s), a delinquent/accused/alleged contemnor may not be able to furnish any defence as he is not aware as to what charge(s) he is required to meet–Every statutory provision requires strict adherence, for the reason that the Statute creates rights in favour of persons concerned–Impugned judgment suffered from non-observance of the principles of natural justice and not ensuring the compliance of Statutory Rules, 1952–Trial itself suffered from material procedural defect and stood vitiated–Appeal allowed.; Sahdeo @ Sahdeo Singh v. State of U.P. : 2010(2) Law Herald (SC) 881

Allotment of Flats

Delhi Development Authority–For allotment of plot eligibility Condition–Clause 1 (2) of the terms and conditions of the Rohini Scheme–Allottee should not own property in Delhi–Exception, any individual share held by person in a jointly owned plot or land under the residential house which is less than 65 sq. m.–The contention that the exception is only intended to apply in regard to holdings by joint family members or co-owners and not in regard to ownership of an apartment–Not tenable–When the term of exception is specific and unambiguous, it is not possible to restrict its applicability or read into it, a meaning other than the plain and normal meaning–Special Leave Petition dismissed.; Delhi Development Authority v. Jitender Pal Bhardwaj : 2010(5) Law Herald (SC) 3583

Interpretation–When a person acquires a flat in a multi-storied building, what he gets is co-ownership of the land on which the building is constructed and exclusive ownership/long-term lease of the residential flat–As per Clause 1(ii)–Where the individual share in the land on which the building stands, held by the allottee is less than 65 Sq. M.–He is not barred from securing allotment from DDA. The other interpretation is that if the measurement of the flat is less than 65 Sq. M. and the allottee owns only an undivided share in the land, corresponding to such flat, the benefit of exemption would be available to the applicant.; Delhi Development Authority v. Jitender Pal Bhardwaj : 2010(5) Law Herald (SC) 3583

Right to Allotment–Mere draw of lots/allocation letter does not confer any right to allotment–The system of draw of lots is being resorted to with a view to identify the prospective allottee–It is only a mode, a method, a process to identify the allottee i.e. the process of selection–It is not an allotment by itself–Mere identification or selection of the allottee does not clothe the person selected with a legal right to allotment. ; Greater Mohali Area Development & Anr. v. Manju Jain & Ors. : 2010(5) Law Herald (SC) 3407

Andhra Pradesh Buildings (Lease, Rent and Eviction) Control Act, 1960

S.10(3)(a)(i)(a)–Eviction–Non bonafide requirement–Admittedly–Landlady, who is permanently residing in Hyderabad with her family consisting of a son and two daughters and she has got two houses there, only because she has expressed her desire to stay at this old age of 70 years in the tenanted premises, it cannot be said that the requirement of the landlady has been proved to be genuine–Concurrent finding of facts by Rent Controller and Appellate Authority reversed by High Court and eviction grated–Impugned order of High Court set aside and eviction not granted.; N. Eswari W/o Adhinarayana Rao v. K. Swarajya Lakshmi W/o K.V.L.N.A. Sastry (Late) : 2009(6) Law Herald (SC) 3674 : 2009 (9) SCC 678 : 2009 (12) JT 105

Andhra Pradesh Education Act, 1982

S. 78 and 99– Andhra Pradesh Educational Service Rules, Rule 2 & 3(Note 6)–Promotion–Classification–Whether persons drawn from different sources and integrated into one class/cadre/category can be classified into separate categories for purposes of promotion on the basis of the source from which they were drawn–Held,NO–Classification of persons drawn from different sources who stand integrated into one class for the purpose of promotion–Direct recruits and the promotees may have come from different sources but once they are integrated into one class, there can be no classification as between them on the basis of their birth marks–Note 6 to Rule 3 was unconstitutional inasmuch as the same classified officers eligible for appointment against class II category 1 posts depending upon whether they were direct recruits or promotees. Such a classification based on the birth mark that stood obliterated after integration of officers coming from different source into a common cadre/category would be wholly unjustified and discriminatory–Tribunal rightly declared Note 6 to Rule 3 of the Rules to be ultra vires.; B. Manmad Reddy v. Chandra Prakash Reddy : 2010(2) Law Herald (SC) 1162

Andhra Pradesh Educational Service Rules

R. 2 & 3(Note 6)–Andhra Pradesh Education Act, 1982, Sections 78 and 99-Promotion–Classification–Whether persons drawn from different sources and integrated into one class/cadre/category can be classified into separate categories for purposes of promotion on the basis of the source from which they were drawn–Held,NO–Classification of persons drawn from different sources who stand integrated into one class for the purpose of promotion–Direct recruits and the promotees may have come from different sources but once they are integrated into one class, there can be no classification as between them on the basis of their birth marks–Note 6 to Rule 3 was unconstitutional inasmuch as the same classified officers eligible for appointment against class II category 1 posts depending upon whether they were direct recruits or promotees. Such a classification based on the birth mark that stood obliterated after integration of officers coming from different source into a common cadre/category would be wholly unjustified and discriminatory–Tribunal rightly declared Note 6 to Rule 3 of the Rules to be ultra vires.; B. Manmad Reddy v. Chandra Prakash Reddy : 2010(2) Law Herald (SC) 1162

Andhra Pradesh Electricity Reform Act, 1998

S.11–Electricity Act, 2003, Ss.61, 62 r/w S.86(1)(a)(b)–Tariff–Determination of–Jurisdiction and fixation of tariff by the Regulatory Commission–Andhra Pradesh Electricity Regulatory Commission has the jurisdiction to determine tariff which takes within its ambit the ‘purchase price’ for procurement of the electricity generated by the Non-conventional energy developers/generators, in the facts and circumstances of these cases. ; Transmission Corporation of Andhra Pradesh Ltd. & Anr. v. Sai Renewable Power Pvt. Ltd. & Ors. : 2010(5) Law Herald (SC) 3136

S.11–Electricity Act, 2003, Ss.61, 62 r/w S.86(1)(a)(b)–Tariff–Determination of–Fixation of tariff is a statutory function as specified under the provisions of the Reform Act, 1998, Electricity Regulatory Commissions Act, 1998 and the Electricity Act, 2003–These functions are required to be performed by the expert bodies to whom the job is assigned under the law. ; Transmission Corporation of Andhra Pradesh Ltd. v. Sai Renewable Power Pvt. Ltd. : 2010(5) Law Herald (SC) 3136

Andhra Pradesh Employment (Organization of Local Cadres and Regulation of Direct Recruitment) Order, 1975

Para 3(6) and 14(f)–Andhra Pradesh Members of Police Force (Regulation of Transfers) Act, 1985, S.2(b), (c), 3 and 4–Hyderabad City Police Act 1348 Fasli, Ss.3(b) and 7–Constitution of India, 1950, Art. 371-D and 371-E–Transfer–Inspectors of Police–State Government issued orders whereby Inspectors of Police in Hyderabad City Police were transferred back/repatriated to their parent cadres in other police ranges–Twenty two Sub-Inspectors of Hyderabad City Police challenged the transfers of 89 Sub-Inspectors and Inspectors of different districts to the City of Hyderabad–Applications dismissed–Contention of applicants that Hyderabad City Police is part and parcel of Zone VI rejected by Tribunal–Full Bench of HC held no separate cadre of Hyderabad City Police and no incumbent for post of Police Officers as defined in S.3(b) of Hyderabad Act; Inspectors of Police working in Hyderabad City Police establishments either on promotion to that post or by direct recruitment, must be considered as belonging to Zone VI in zonal cadre–A separate cadre carved out for Hyderabad City Police and recruitment to the post of Police Officer as defined in Section 3(b) of the Hyderabad Act made by the designated competent authority in terms of Section 7–Full Bench omitted to take note of the fact that in terms of Section 7 of the Hyderabad Act, powers to appoint and promote Inspector, Sub-Inspector and other subordinates of the police force vests in the Commissioner of City Police–Full Bench was not justified in curtailing the width and scope of the exclusion clause contained in paragraph 14(f) of the Presidential Order by holding that there is no separate cadre of Hyderabad City Police and there is no incumbent of the post of Police Officers as defined in Section 3(b) of the Hyderabad Act–Held, that the conclusions recorded by the Full Bench that no separate cadre has been organized for the City of Hyderabad within the meaning of paragraph 3(6) of the Presidential Order; that no recruitment to the post of Police Officer as defined in Section 3(b) of the Hyderabad Act has been made and there is factually no incumbent of the post of Police Officer under paragraph 14(f) of the Presidential Order and that the Inspectors of Police working in the Hyderabad City Police establishment either on promotion to that post or by direct recruitment must be considered as belonging to Zone VI in the zonal cadre cannot be sustained and are liable to be set aside.; P.V. Radha Krishna & Ors. v. State of A.P. & Ors. : 2009(6) Law Herald (SC) 3614 : 2010 (1) SCC 11 : 2009 (13) JT 215

Paras 3(6) and 14(f)–Andhra Pradesh Members of Police Force (Regulation of Transfers) Act, 1985 Sections 2(b), (c), 3 and 4–Hyderabad City Police Act, 1348 Fasli, S.3(b) and 7–Constitution of India, 1950, Art. 371D and 371E–Recruitment–Transfer–Inspectors of Police–Whether there is a separate cadre for Hyderabad City Police or the same falls in Zone-VI which includes District of Hyderabad–State Government issued orders whereby Inspectors of Police in Hyderabad City Police were transferred back/repatriated to their parent cadres in other police ranges–Applications challenging said order dismissed–Contention of applicants that Hyderabad City Police is part and parcel of Zone VI rejected by Tribunal–Full Bench of HC held no separate cadre of Hyderabad City Police and no incumbent for post of Police Officers as defined in s. 3(b) of Hyderabad Act; Inspectors of Police working in Hyderabad City Police establishments either on promotion to that post or by direct recruitment, must be considered as belonging to Zone VI in zonal cadre–After promulgation of the Presidential Order, Hyderabad throughout been treated as an independent zone or free zone till the impugned judgment was pronounced and recruitment to the post of Police Officer as defined in Section 3(b) of the Hyderabad Act was made separately–Full Bench was not justified in curtailing the width and scope of the exclusion clause contained in paragraph 14(f) of the presidential Order by holding that there is no separate cadre of Hyderabad City Police and there is no incumbent of the post of Police Officers as defined in Section 3(b) of the Hyderabad Act.; P.V. Radha Krishna & Ors. v. State of A.P. & Ors. : 2009(6) Law Herald (SC) 3614 : 2010 (1) SCC 11 : 2009 (13) JT 215

Andhra Pradesh Excise Act, 1968

S.34(e), 41 and 42– Criminal Procedure Code, 1973, S.482–Quashing of FIR–Validity–Seizure of 5,040 kgs. of black jaggery–Seized substance fit for fermentation producing alcohol unfit for consumption–Apart from specific allegations about the transportation of Jaggery for preparation of illicit distilled liquor, prosecution also placed reliance on laboratory analysis report which mentions that the transported Jaggery is fit for fermentation, producing alchol unfit for consumption–Whether the raw material in existence would be sufficient for holding the accused persons concerned guilty or not has to be considered only at the time of trial–Interference at the threshold quashing the FIR is to be exceptional and not like routine as ordered by the High Court–High Court was not justified in quashing the FIR–Impugned judgment of the High Court, set aside. ; State of A.P. v. Gourishetty Mahesh & Ors. : 2010(5) Law Herald (SC) 3033

Andhra Pradesh Land Grabbing (Prohibition) Act, 1982

Recovery of the possession–G (predecessor of the respondents) illegally occupied 5 acres land–Notices were issued to G under Section 7 of the Andhra Pradesh Land Encroachment Act, 1905 but no order passed for his eviction–In 1990, Mandal Revenue Officer, (appellant herein) filed an application before the Special Tribunal constituted under the Land Grabbing Act for recovery of the possession of 5 acres land illegally occupied by G–Respondents being LRs pleaded that they acquired title over the Scheduled property by adverse possession–Division Bench did not disturb concurrent finding recorded by the Special Tribunal and the Special Court that the schedule land is Government land but set aside the orders passed by them to handover possession of the Scheduled land to the Government on the premise that the respondents acquired title by adverse possession–Appeal–whether the Division Bench of the High Court justified in interfering with the orders passed by the Special Tribunal and Special Court for eviction of the respondents–Held, No–Respondents failed to prove that their possession was open and hostile to the Government so as to entitle them to claim title over the schedule land by adverse possession–Held, that the respondents miserably failed to establish that they had acquired title over the schedule land by adverse possession and the High Court was not at all justified in upsetting the orders passed by the Special Tribunal and Special Court–Impugned order of the High Court set aside and that of the Special Tribunal and Special Court restored.; Mandal Revenue Officer v. Goundla Venkaiah : 2010(1) Law Herald (SC) 630

S. 7, 8, 10, 16 and 17–Andhra Pradesh Land Grabbing (Prohibition) Rules, 1988, Rule 6, 10 and 15.–Land and Property Law–Adverse possession–Jurisdiction of Special Tribunal|–Determination of a question of adverse possession whether would come within the purview of the jurisdiction of Special Tribunal and/or Special Court constituted under the Andhra Pradesh Land Grabbing (Prohibition) Act, 1982–The Special Courts and Tribunals, indisputably are entitled to determine any question or issue including the question of title or possession in the proceedings initiated before it–Special Courts and the Tribunal not only have trappings of a court but also of a civil court and, thus, are entitled to determine complicated questions of title–Tribunal/Special Court constituted under the Act has the requisite jurisdiction to go into the question of adverse possession; V. Laxminarasamma v. A. Yadaiah (Dead) : 2009(2) Law Herald (SC) 1045 : 2009(5) SCC 478 : 2009(4) JT 287 : 2009(14) JT 488 : 2009(3) SCALE 685

Ss. 8 & 10–Andhra Pradesh Land Grabbing (Prohibition) Ordinance, 1982–Land Grabbing–Eviction–Contention that respondents without having any right, title or interest on the said land, yet illegally grabbed the schedule property and started construction of multi-storeyed complexes–Respondent No. 1 had purchased land from its previous owners whose names were already mutated in the land records and after purchase, Respondent No. 1’s name came to be mutated in the records–Construction of multi-storeyed building only after obtaining sanction and permission from Municipal Corporation–Burden which lay on the Respondents as contemplated under Section 10 of the Act has fully been discharged–State failed to establish that respondents are land grabbers–No fault found either in the judgment and decree of the Special Court or in the judgment and order passed by Division Bench of the High Court–Appeal dismissed.; State of A.P. v. Hyderabad Potteries Pvt. Ltd : 2010(3) Law Herald (SC) 2043

Andhra Pradesh Land Grabbing (Prohibition) Ordinance, 1982

Andhra Pradesh Land Grabbing (Prohibition) Act, 1982, Ss. 8 & 10–Land Grabbing–Eviction–Contention that respondents without having any right, title or interest on the said land, yet illegally grabbed the schedule property and started construction of multi-storeyed complexes–Respondent No. 1 had purchased land from its previous owners whose names were already mutated in the land records and after purchase, Respondent No. 1’s name came to be mutated in the records–Construction of multi-storeyed building only after obtaining sanction and permission from Municipal Corporation–Burden which lay on the Respondents as contemplated under Section 10 of the Act has fully been discharged–State failed to establish that respondents are land grabbers–No fault found either in the judgment and decree of the Special Court or in the judgment and order passed by Division Bench of the High Court–Appeal dismissed.; State of A.P. v. Hyderabad Potteries Pvt. Ltd : 2010(3) Law Herald (SC) 2043

Andhra Pradesh Land Grabbing (Prohibition) Rules, 1988

Rule 6, 10 and 15–Andhra Pradesh Land Grabbing (Prohibition), Act, 1982, Section 7, 8, 10, 16 and 17–Land and Property Law–Adverse possession–Jurisdiction of Special Tribunal|–Determination of a question of adverse possession whether would come within the purview of the jurisdiction of Special Tribunal and/or Special Court constituted under the Andhra Pradesh Land Grabbing (Prohibition) Act, 1982–The Special Courts and Tribunals, indisputably are entitled to determine any question or issue including the question of title or possession in the proceedings initiated before it–Special Courts and the Tribunal not only have trappings of a court but also of a civil court and, thus, are entitled to determine complicated questions of title–Tribunal/Special Court constituted under the Act has the requisite jurisdiction to go into the question of adverse possession; V. Laxminarasamma v. A. Yadaiah (Dead) : 2009(2) Law Herald (SC) 1045 : 2009(5) SCC 478 : 2009(4) JT 287 : 2009(14) JT 488 : 2009(3) SCALE 685

Andhra Pradesh Members of Police Force (Regulation of Transfers) Act, 1985

S.2(b), (c), 3 and 4–Andhra Pradesh Employment (Organization of Local Cadres and Regulation of Direct Recruitment) Order, 1975, para 3(6) and 14(f)–Hyderabad City Police Act 1348 Fasli, Ss.3(b) and 7–Constitution of India, 1950, Art. 371-D and 371-E–Transfer–Inspectors of Police–State Government issued orders whereby Inspectors of Police in Hyderabad City Police were transferred back/repatriated to their parent cadres in other police ranges–Twenty two Sub-Inspectors of Hyderabad City Police challenged the transfers of 89 Sub-Inspectors and Inspectors of different districts to the City of Hyderabad–Applications dismissed–Contention of applicants that Hyderabad City Police is part and parcel of Zone VI rejected by Tribunal–Full Bench of HC held no separate cadre of Hyderabad City Police and no incumbent for post of Police Officers as defined in S.3(b) of Hyderabad Act; Inspectors of Police working in Hyderabad City Police establishments either on promotion to that post or by direct recruitment, must be considered as belonging to Zone VI in zonal cadre–A separate cadre carved out for Hyderabad City Police and recruitment to the post of Police Officer as defined in Section 3(b) of the Hyderabad Act made by the designated competent authority in terms of Section 7–Full Bench omitted to take note of the fact that in terms of Section 7 of the Hyderabad Act, powers to appoint and promote Inspector, Sub-Inspector and other subordinates of the police force vests in the Commissioner of City Police–Full Bench was not justified in curtailing the width and scope of the exclusion clause contained in paragraph 14(f) of the Presidential Order by holding that there is no separate cadre of Hyderabad City Police and there is no incumbent of the post of Police Officers as defined in Section 3(b) of the Hyderabad Act–Held, that the conclusions recorded by the Full Bench that no separate cadre has been organized for the City of Hyderabad within the meaning of paragraph 3(6) of the Presidential Order; that no recruitment to the post of Police Officer as defined in Section 3(b) of the Hyderabad Act has been made and there is factually no incumbent of the post of Police Officer under paragraph 14(f) of the Presidential Order and that the Inspectors of Police working in the Hyderabad City Police establishment either on promotion to that post or by direct recruitment must be considered as belonging to Zone VI in the zonal cadre cannot be sustained and are liable to be set aside.; P.V. Radha Krishna & Ors. v. State of A.P. & Ors. : 2009(6) Law Herald (SC) 3614 : 2010 (1) SCC 11 : 2009 (13) JT 215

S.2(b), (c), 3 and 4–Andhra Pradesh Employment (Organization of Local Cadres and Regulation of Direct Recruitment) Order, 1975, paras 3(6) and 14(f)–Hyderabad City Police Act, 1348 Fasli, S.3(b) and 7–Constitution of India, 1950, Art. 371D and 371E–Recruitment–Transfer–Inspectors of Police–Whether there is a separate cadre for Hyderabad City Police or the same falls in Zone-VI which includes District of Hyderabad–State Government issued orders whereby Inspectors of Police in Hyderabad City Police were transferred back/repatriated to their parent cadres in other police ranges–Applications challenging said order dismissed–Contention of applicants that Hyderabad City Police is part and parcel of Zone VI rejected by Tribunal–Full Bench of HC held no separate cadre of Hyderabad City Police and no incumbent for post of Police Officers as defined in s. 3(b) of Hyderabad Act; Inspectors of Police working in Hyderabad City Police establishments either on promotion to that post or by direct recruitment, must be considered as belonging to Zone VI in zonal cadre–After promulgation of the Presidential Order, Hyderabad throughout been treated as an independent zone or free zone till the impugned judgment was pronounced and recruitment to the post of Police Officer as defined in Section 3(b) of the Hyderabad Act was made separately–Full Bench was not justified in curtailing the width and scope of the exclusion clause contained in paragraph 14(f) of the presidential Order by holding that there is no separate cadre of Hyderabad City Police and there is no incumbent of the post of Police Officers as defined in Section 3(b) of the Hyderabad Act.; P.V. Radha Krishna & Ors. v. State of A.P. & Ors. : 2009(6) Law Herald (SC) 3614 : 2010 (1) SCC 11 : 2009 (13) JT 215

Andhra Pradesh Panchayat Raj Act, 1994

S. 233–Corrupt practice–Election Petition–Post of Sarpanch of a Gram Panchayat–Recounting of votes–Upon counting of votes, the appellant secured 552 votes in the election–Petitioner, the nearest rival, got 550 votes–Appellant declared as the returned candidate in the election to the post of Sarpanch of Gram Panchayat–1st respondent alleged corrupt practice in the election and sought re-counting of votes–Appellant was declared as elected after the re-counting as there was majority of 2 votes–1st respondent filed an Election Petition before Election Tribunal–Election Tribunal ordered re–counting of the votes–Appellant filed Revision Petition before High Court–High Court dismissed the Revision–Legality–Election Tribunal as also the High court lost sight of the parameters to be applied while considering the petition seeking re-counting of votes–Held, Election Tribunal had itself observed that 1st respondent failed to state material facts regarding the alleged corrupt practice in the Election Petition–A narrow margin of 2 votes between appellant and 1st respondent does not per se give rise to a presumption that there had been an irregularity or illegality in counting of votes–No material on record available on the basis the Election Tribunal could have arrived at positive finding that a case to order re-count of ballot papers had been made out–Onus to prove the allegation of irregularity, impropriety or illegality in the election process on the part of the Election Officer is on the election petitioner and not on the Election Officer, as held by the authorities below–Order of re-count passed by the Election Tribunal was illegal and the High Court erred in upholding it–Order passed by the Election Tribunal ordering re-count of the ballot papers, and affirmed by the High Court set aside.; Kattinokkula Murali Krishna v. Veeramalla Koteswara Rao & Ors. : 2009(6) Law Herald (SC) 3949 : AIR 2010 (SC) 24 : 2010 (1) SCC 466 : 2009 (14) JT 458

S. 233–Recounting of votes–A narrow margin of 2 votes between appellant and 1st respondent does not per se give rise to a presumption that there had been an irregularity or illegality in counting of votes; Kattinokkula Murali Krishna v. Veeramalla Koteswara Rao & Ors. : 2009(6) Law Herald (SC) 3949 : AIR 2010 (SC) 24 : 2010 (1) SCC 466 : 2009 (14) JT 458

Andhra Pradesh Record of Rights in Land Act, 1971

Civil Procedure Code, 1908, O. 39, R. 1 and 2–Injunction–Permanent Injunction–Tenants filed suit for claiming tenancy rights and also prayed for permanent injunction restraining the Respondents from interfering with their possession over the said land–Tenants were cultivating the land in question since time immemorial and, therefore, entitled to a decree for permanent injunction against the landlords–Landlords failed to prove their possession and cultivation in respect of the lands in question by producing reliable and material evidence before the court–High Court had granted a decree for permanent injunction in favour of the tenants mainly on the basis that the tenants were in possession and cultivation of the disputed lands and after considering the fact the landlords had failed to prove their possession and cultivation in respect of the lands in question by producing reliable and material evidence before the court–High Court justified in allowing the second appeal of the tenants.; Pinninti Kistamma v. Duvvada P. Chowdary : 2010(2) Law Herald (SC) 964

Civil Procedure Code, 1908, O.39 R. 1&2–Permanent Injunction–Tenants filed suit for claiming tenancy rights and also prayed for permanent injunction restraining the Respondents from interfering with their possession over the said land–Tenants/respondents filed their suit for permanent injunction limiting their claim to the extent of 19.80 Acres of land–High Court was fully justified in reviewing the said judgment allowing the second appeal of the tenants only to the extent of 19.80 Acres of land–No ground to interfere with the order of the High Court.; Pinninti Kistamma v. Duvvada P. Chowdary : 2010(2) Law Herald (SC) 964

Andhra Pradesh (Regulation of Appointments to Public Services and Rationalization of Staff Pattern and Pay Structure) Act, 1994

Ss. 3, 4, 7 and 9–Service and Labour Law–Regularisation of Service|–Daily wager–Whether the persons employed on daily wage basis or nominal muster roll or consolidated pay or as contingent worker on full time basis in different departments of the Government of Andhra Pradesh and its agencies/instrumentalities are entitled to be regularised in service on completion of 5 years?–NO.; A. Manjula Bhashini & Ors. v. The Managing Director, A.P. Women’s Cooperative Finance Corporation Ltd. & Anr. : 2009(4) Law Herald (SC) 2663 : 2009(8) SCC 4331 : 2009(9) JT 229 : 2009(9) SCALE 99 : 2009(10) SCR 634

Ss. 3, 4, 7 and 9–Service and Labour Law–Regularisation of service|–Daily wager–Cut Off date–Whether the cut off date, i.e., 25.11.1993 specified in the first proviso to Section 7 of the 1994 Act for determination of the eligibility of daily wage employees to be considered for regularisation is arbitrary, irrational and violative of Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution–Held; NO.; A. Manjula Bhashini & Ors. v. The Managing Director, A.P. Women’s Cooperative Finance Corporation Ltd. & Anr., D/d. 06/07/2009 : 2009(4) LAW HERALD (SC) 2663

Ss. 3, 4, 7 and 9–Service and Labour Law–Regularisation of service|–Daily wager–Whether the amendments made in the 1994 Act have the effect of nullifying or overriding the judgment of this Court in District Collector v. M.L. Singh and whether Section 7A amounts to an encroachment on courts’ power of judicial review–NO.; A. Manjula Bhashini & Ors. v. The Managing Director, A.P. Women’s Cooperative Finance Corporation Ltd. & Anr., D/d. 06/07/2009 : 2009(4) LAW HERALD (SC) 2663

Andhra Pradesh (Telangana Area) Tenancy & Agricultural Lands Act, 1950

S. 38-E–Eviction–Protected tenants–Ownership certificates–Grant of–Respondents claimed to have purchased the land from the original land holder and sought to disentitle the appellants of their rights–Predecessor-in-interest of the appellants claimed to be protected tenants and sought ownership certificates to become full owners of the suit land–Respondents did not produce evidence to substantiate claim of ownership and acquiring possessors rights over suit land–Predecessor-in-interest of the Appellants No. 1 and 3 were declared to be protected tenants and ownership certificates issued–Regarding predecessor-in-interest of Appellant No. 2, Revenue Divisional Officer concluded that the surrender was invalid–High Court held that the certificates in favour of the appellants were issued without any proper appreciation of the material available on record–Appeal against–Held , it is not permissible for the High Court to reopen the issue either of grant or issuance of tenancy certificate or deal with the issue of restoration of possession of Appellant No. 1 and 3 as already attained finality–Mere pendency of proceedings before the Court/Tribunal cannot defeat the rights of a party, which had already been determined–orders of the High Court set aside–Appeal allowed.; Edukanti Kistamma (Dead) Thr. Lrs. v. S. Venkatareddy (Dead) Thr. Lrs. 2010(1) Law Herald (SC) 57

Andhra Pradesh Tenancy Act, 1956

S. 2(c), 2(f) and 13– Madras Hindu Religious and Charitable Endowments Act, 1929–Rent Control–Lease–Tenant-landlord relationship–Whether a permanent lease gives rise to a tenant-landlord relationship within the meaning of the Act?–Held ,Yes — A person qualify to be a landlord under the meaning of the Act if he is entitled to evict the tenant–Such entitlement can arise either directly due to the agreement entered into (i.e. by providing the time period of tenancy) or by providing the conditions or terms of tenancy violating which the tenant may be evicted u/s. 13–No reason why a permanent lease which provides terms would not result in a tenant-landlord relationship since it is implied in such an agreement that non fulfillment of the prescribed terms would give the right to the landlord to evict the tenant –One such term can be payment of periodic rent, which exists in instant case– Respondents do qualify as landlords–Tenants committed default in payment of rent–They are liable to be evicted as per S. 13 of the Act which was rightly affirmed by the High Court–No reason to interfere in the order of HC; Chittoor Chegaiah v. Pedda Jeeyangar Mutt : 2010(2) Law Herald (SC) 945

Andhra Pradesh (A.A.) Tenancy Act, 1956

S. 2(c) , 2(f) and 13 –Madras Hindu Religious and Charitable Endowments Act, 1929– Civil Procedure Code, 1908, S. 11– Rent Control–Res judicata–Whether the decision of the HC in holding that the findings given the earlier judgment on the same subject matter, would not operate as res judicata, when in the said decision the HC held that the appellants perfected their title by adverse possession in the schedule property and the suit was barred by limitation?–Held, No–Decision of the HC would not bar any proceedings under the Tenancy Act as the issue decided by the HC in that instance was merely the tenancy title in favour of the appellants–Case was for eviction of tenants u/s. 13 of the Act–Proceedings not barred by res judicata.; Chittoor Chegaiah v. Pedda Jeeyangar Mutt : 2010(2) Law Herald (SC) 945

Apprentices Act, 1961

Appointment–Question whether or not the apprentices were required to appear in the written examination would depend upon the statutory Rules and Regulations governing the recruitments in question–High Court took the view that the recruitment regulations provided for a written examination and hence, it was a condition precedent for all candidates, apprentices not excluded, to appear in the examination and to qualify for appointment–High Court has taken the correct view of the matter that does not call for any interference.; Santosh Kumar Tripathi & Ors. v. U. P. Power Corporation & Ors. : 2009(6) Law Herald (SC) 4007 : 2009 (14) JT 223

S. 22–Evidence Act, 1872, Section 115–Service & Labour Law–Ex-trade apprentices|–Absorption–Old practice, long discontinued, under which the Calcutta Port Trust in the port’s Mechanical Engineering department used to make recruitment of trained apprentices and wards of employees dying in harness in the ratio of 1:1–321 trained apprentices approached High Court–They made the grievance that in disregard of the practice earlier followed, the Calcutta Port Trust was giving appointments only on compassionate grounds to the wards of their employees dying in harness and had completely stopped the recruitment of trained apprentices–Direction on basis of said communication, set aside–Orders passed by High Court are plainly unsustainable; Board of Trustees for Port of Calcutta v. Avijit Kumar Ray : 2009(2) Law Herald (SC) 908 : 2009 (1) SCC 743 : 2000 (13) JT 337

(English) Arbitration Act, 1996

S.15(3)–Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996, S.2(1)(d), 10(2) and 11–Appointment of arbitrator–Number of Arbitrators–Several meetings were held between the parties for settling the dispute amicably but the said efforts ultimately did not succeed–Agreement between parties providing for settlement of dispute through arbitration–Contention of respondent that they had taken a policy decision that in case of dispute, three arbitrator will be appointed rejected–Clause 12.2 of the Arbitration clause silent about the number of arbitrators. Therefore, Section 10(2) of the said Act squarely applies–Arbitration clause 12.2 is silent as to the number of arbitrators. The said clause read with Section 10(2) of the Act makes it very clear that arbitral tribunal would be consisting of a sole arbitrator.; Sime Darby Engineering SDN, BHD v. Engineering India Ltd. : 2009(6) Law Herald (SC) 3735 : AIR 2009 (SC) 3158 : 2009 (7) SCC 545 : 2009 (9) JT 469

Arbitration Act, 1940

Arbitral award–Arbitrator duly scrutinized and evaluated the evidence and had given the award with elaborate reasons–Same cannot be said to be perverse or based on no evidence to warrant interference by High Court– High Court while examining objections to the well reasoned award under Section 30 of the Act, 1940, cannot re-appreciate the evidence led by parties before arbitrator to substitute its own opinion–High Court erroneously substituted the conclusion of the arbitrator with its own opinion on appreciation of the evidence–Impugned judgment of the High Court set aside.; M/s. Ravindra Kumar Gupta & Company v. Union of India, : 2010(1) Law Herald (SC) 436

Arbitration–Award–Formation of Canal including siphons and cross drainage works–Disputes and differences arose between the parties–Appellant raised claim, referred to Arbitration–Arbitrator passed a reasoned award whereby the claims nos. a, b, c, d, g were allowed–Award made the rule of the Court–Division Bench set aside the claims nos. ‘a’ to ‘d’ and decree was passed only in terms of claim ‘g’–Appeal–Arbitrator on facts found that there were substantial changes in the designs of the canal as well as the structure regarding claims Nos. a and b,–Arbitrator stated cogent reasons for allowing those claims as there were substantial changes in the designs of the canal –No materials in support for granting claims Nos. (c) and (d) by the Arbitrator–Findings recorded by the Arbitrator not been controverted by the respondents by adducing any evidence–Finding was recorded by the Arbitrator after site inspection and perusing the measurement book–Impugned orders of the High Court in respect of claims (a) and (b) set aside and in respect of claims nos. (c) and (d) sustained.; O.P. Pathrose v. State of Kerala : 2010(2) Law Herald (SC) 1307

Section 8 and 9–Limitation Act, 1963, Article 137–Arbitration Act, 1940, Section 37.–Arbitration & Conciliation Act, 1996, Section 11–Arbitration Law–Arbitration proceedings|–Agreement between parties–Construction work given by a company to a contractor–In 1974 certain recovery made from Bill of contractor by a Company–Contractor raised dispute and sent a notice to company to appoint Arbitrator in the year 1984–Cause of action arose when recovery from the contractor was made in the year 1974–Claim of contractor was barred by limitation which was 3 years under Article 137 of Limitation Act from date of cause of action–If a disputed claim is not raised before Arbitrator by the party within 3 years from accrual of cause of action the claim would become barred by limitation; Visakhapatnam Port Trust v. Continental Construction Company : 2009(2) Law Herald (SC) 1419 : 2009(4) SCC 546 : 2009(4) JT 335 : 2009(3) SCALE 670

Sections 8, 9 and 20–Limitation Act, 1963, Article 137–Arbitration Act, Section 37(3).–Arbitration & Conciliation Act, 1996, Section 11–Arbitration Law–Arbitration agreement–Limitation|–Dispute arose in the year 1975–Notice to appoint an arbitrator sent by party to the other party in the year 1975–Arbitrator appointed by the parties, but the arbitrator did not enter upon reference–Civil Suit filed by the part in the year 1979, for appointment of new arbitrator–Suit not barred by limitation; Visakhapatnam Port Trust v. Continental Construction Company : 2009(2) Law Herald (SC) 1419 : 2009(4) SCC 546 : 2009(4) JT 335 : 2009(3) SCALE 670

Ss. 14, 17 and 30–Insurance–Arbitration–Renewal Insurance Policy–Insurer(Respondent) issued a Renewal Insurance Policy to the appellant(Bank)-Policy indemnified and insured the Bank against losses caused by Bank’s employees-Series of embezzlements by employee ‘L’ of the Bank-Bank claimed indemnity from the Insurer-Insurer informed the Bank that its assessors had assessed the reimbursable loss as Rs.29,000/-and offered the said sum in full settlement of the claim-Bank sought arbitration-Arbitrator held that the insurer could not apply the Excess clause to each and every loss separately and having regard to the terms of the policy, the amounts embezzled had to be aggregated and out of the total loss, the Bank had to bear 25% and the insurer was liable to pay the balance-Civil Judge upheld the award–HC followed the decision of Single Judge in Central Bank of India vs. New India Assurance Company Limited and held that arbitrator ought to have considered each item of embezzlement separately and could not aggregate the amounts embezzled by ‘L’,-Appeal-Words “each and every claim” were used in the Schedule with reference to losses under Contingency 4 by describing the Excess as “25% on each and every claim or Rs.11,500/-whichever is higher on D.A.R.” Stipulated exemption from indemnity was in regard to each and every loss-Necessary to identify each act of embezzlement by ‘L’ in regard to each account, as the loss on account of each embezzlement forms a separate claim-Bank has to bear 25% of the amount embezzled (or 11500/-whichever is higher) in regard to each and every embezzlement, and not by aggregation of the embezzlements-Award of the arbitrator , set aside–Order of HC, Upheld-Appeal dismissed. ; The Amravati District Central Co-operative Bank Ltd. v. United India Fire & General Insurance Co. Ltd. : 2010(3) Law Herald (SC) 1787

S. 14(2) & 17, 30 and 33–Limitation Act, 1963, Art. 119 –Arbitration–Objections–Limitation–Period of limitation for filing objections seeking the setting aside of an arbitration Award commenced from the date of service of notice issued by the Court upon the parties regarding the fling of the Award under Section 14(2) of the Act–The issuance of such notice by the Court is a mandatory requirement and limitation would begin only after notice of the filing of the Award is given by the Court. [(1996) 5 SCC 400) relied.; Union of India v. M/s Neelam Engineering & Construction Company : 2010(4) Law Herald (SC) 2355

S. 14(2), 17 , 29 , 30 and 33–Limitation Act, 1963, Art. 119–Arbitration–Appellant and the Respondent ,Construction Company, entered into agreement for providing additional security lighting arrangement in various zones–Certain disputes arose between the Appellants and the Respondent which were referred to the arbitration for adjudication of the said disputes –Arbitrator made his award in favour of the respondent–Respondents filed petition for making the Arbitral award, a Rule of Court–Appellants filed objections against the arbitral award–Civil Court ordered to make the award a Rule of Court–Appeal Court concluded that the objection filed on behalf of the Appellants could not be held to be barred by limitation, but was pre-mature and the Appellants were not competent to file the said objection before the Award was received in the Court–High Court affirmed the orders of the Appeal Court–Appeal–Objection filed by the Appellant under Sections 30 and 33 of the Arbitration Act, 1940, for setting aside the Award on 3rd January, 1998, was obviously on account of the fact that the Respondent had filed a petition in the Civil Court on 27th February, 1996, for making the Award a Rule of Court–At the time when the objection was filed, it was noted on 18th February, 1998, that the Award had not been received in Court and notice was issued to the Arbitrator to file the original Award in pursuance whereof the original Award was filed in Court on 27th May, 1998- Filing an objection against something which did not exist on the date when the objection was filed is unacceptable and must be rejected–Held , that although the appellants filed their objection under Sections 30 and 33 the same was done prematurely even before the filing of the Award and such objection could not be treated as a valid objection under Sections 30 and 33 of the Act in view of the provisions of Article 119 of the Limitation Act, 1963–Appeal dismissed; Union of India v. M/s Neelam Engineering & Construction Company : 2010(4) Law Herald (SC) 2355

Ss. 14(2) & 17, 30 and 33–Limitation Act, 1963, Art. 119–Arbitration–Objections–Limitation–In view of Section 19 of the Limitation Act, 1963, the period of limitation for filing an application commences only after the date of service of the notice of the making of the Award–The raison d’etre for filing objection under Sections 30 and 33 of the Arbitration Act, 1940, is the Award which has to be filed in Court either by the Arbitrator or at the instance of any of the parties requiring the Arbitrator to do so–Even the Court may direct the Arbitrator to file his award on the application made by any of the parties thereto–Filing an objection against something which did not exist on the date when the objection was filed is unacceptable and must be rejected.; Union of India v. M/s Neelam Engineering & Construction Company : 2010(4) Law Herald (SC) 2355

S. 15– Civil Procedure Code, 1908, S. 7–Extension of time– Arbitral Award– Court has been denuded of the power to enlarge time for making and publishing an award. It is true that apparently there is no provision under the Act for the Court to fix a time limit for the conclusion of an arbitration proceeding, but the Court can opt to do so in the exercise of its inherent power on the application of either party–Where however the Arbitration agreement itself provides the procedure for enlargement of time and the parties have taken recourse to it, and consented to the enlargement of time by the arbitrator, the Court cannot exercise its inherent power in extending the time fixed by the parties in the absence of the consent of either of them.; N.B.C.C. Ltd. v. J.G. Engin